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Introduction

The provision of subsidies by governments is

widespread practice.

Recent years saw

a

a

steady rise in

the provision of subsidies by OECD countries.'^

Subsidies in Billion US-Dollars^

Country

1995

1996

1997

OECD-Total

317.02

392.54

485.86

EC 15

193.87

204.99

202.82

U.S.A.

34.0

33.5

32.9

Governments provide subsidies for

a

variety of reasons

and they are an important tool "to promote important

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is
comprised of industrialized countries, all of which are Members of
the OECD Convention, which entered into force on September 30, 1961.
The following countries are
See OECD, Annual Report 1997 (1998).
currently members of the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States.
The Commission of the European Communities
takes part in the work of the OECD.

objectives of national policy."^

Among those objectives

are
"(a)

the elimination of industrial,

economic and social

disadvantages of specific regions,
(b)

to facilitate the restructuring,

under socially

acceptable conditions, of certain sectors,

especially where this has become necessary by
reason of changes in trade and economic policies,

including international agreements resulting in
lower barriers to trade,
(c)

generally to sustain employment and to encourage
re-training and change in employment,

(d)

to encourage research and development programmes,

especially in the field of high-technology
industries,
(e)

the implementation of economic programmes and

policies to promote the economic and social

development of developing countries,
(f)

redeployment of industry in order to avoid

congestion and environmental problems."^

2

OECD, National Accounts,
36-37 (1999)

Main Aggregates 1960-1997,

Volume 1,

18-19,

22-23,

.

^

Agreement on
XXIII of the
Preamble, 31
(hereinafter

Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979,
U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. 9619, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204
Subsidies Code)

3

The policy behind the fact that subsidies are addressed
in international agreements is that they create a

distortion in international trade and that they "can
quickly and destructively spread from nation to nation."^
They create "a disparity between the actual costs incurred
in producing a particular good and those which must be

borne by the firm undertaking its production."^

But

because the concentrated interests of producers command
greater political support than the diffuse interests of
consumers, national governments find it much easier to

emulate the vices of protection than the virtues of free
This lesson has prompted the international

trade.

community to fashion guidelines that distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable national subsidy measures
and to codify those guidelines both in bilateral

treaties and in multilateral agreements.^

Subsidies are in international trade parlance referred
to as

domestic' and ^export' subsidies.

A "domestic

subsidy is granted to an industry on all of its production
if a product,

^

^

''

Gary C.
(1984)

Hufbauer

regardless of whether that production is

&

Joanna Shelton Erb,

Subsidies in International Trade,

5-6

.

Warren F. Schwarz & Eugene W. Harper, Jr., The Regulation of
Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 Mich. L.Rev. 831 (1972).
Hufbauer

&

Shelton,

supra note

5,

at 5-6.

4

exported."^

"An export subsidy, by contrast,

is paid to an

industry only on products that are exported.""
This thesis deals in particular with the treatment of

domestic subsidies in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and

Countervailing Measures

(SCM Agreement)

^°

and the

imposition of countervailing duties to offset them under
Section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930^\

John H. Jackson et ai., 1ic-ai Problems z- -n-tip-national Economic Relations:
Cases, Material and Text, 7 57 (3'" ed. 1995)
^

^'^

Id.

at 758.

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993,
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organizarion, Annex
lA, Uruguay Round Agreement Act, PL 103-465, sec. 101(d)(2), 108
Stat.

4809, 4815, 'reprinted in John H. Jackson et al., 1995 Docoments
Supplement to Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 253 (3*^ ed.

1995)

(hereinaf-er SCM Agreement)

" Tariff Act of 1930 sec. 701, 19 U.S.C.A.
(hereinafter The Act).

§

1671

(Kes- Supp.

1998)

6

article or merchandise from such country

...,

then upon the

importation of any such article or merchandise into the
United States

...

there shall be levied and paid

...

and

additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or
grant

...."^^

This general countervailing duty law was

extended in 1922 to cover domestic subsidies.

The

Fordney-McCumber Tariff provided "that whenever any
country

shall pay or bestow

...

...

any bounty or grant upon

the manufacture or production or export of any article or

merchandise manufactured or produced in such country

...,

then upon the importation of any such article or

merchandise into the United States
and paid

...

...

there shall be levied

an additional duty equal to the net amount of

such bounty or grant

...."''^

The Tariff Act of 1922 was the predecessor of the Tariff

Act of 1930^^

Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is now

applicable to the imposition of countervailing duties and

^^

Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, sec. 237, 26 Stat. 584 (1890)
[repealed or otherwise superseded by Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
sec.

^^

(1939)

)

(1939)

1

)

.

Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, sec. 303, 42 Stat. 935 (1922) (repealed
by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, sec. 651(a)(1), 46 Stat. 762
(1930)

^^

1

Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, sec. 5, 30 Stat. 205 (1897) {repealed or
otherwise superseded by Internal Revenue Code of 1939, sec. 4, 53
Stat.

^^

53 Stat.

4,

)

.

Tariff Act of 1930,

ch

.

497,

46 Stat.

590

(1930).

will be scrutinized in detail in Chapter IV of this

thesis
The United States are and have been the country with the

most countervailing measures taken to offset trade

distortions caused by subsidies as the following table
shows

Sxunmary of countervailing duty actions,

1997^^

Reporting

Definitive

Measures in force

measure

on 31 Dec.

Initiations

Party

Argentina
Australia
Brazil

Canada
EC

4

Mexico
New Zealand
Peru

South Africa

United States

^^

10
10
10
12
10
10

1

7

6

5

1

3

8

2

52

6

World Trade Organization,

Annual Report 1998,

89

(Table V.2)

(199^

1997

Venezuela

3

TOTAL

13

87

3

GATT: Articles VI, XVI and XXIII

B.

The first time subsidies were addressed in

a

multilateral agreement was in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade

(GATT) ^\

The basic obligations

concerning subsidies are contained in GATT Article XVI
GATT Article XVI

:

1

sets out a reporting requirement "if

any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy,

including any form of income or price support, which
operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any

product from, or to reduce imports of any product into,
its territory.

"^^

Furthermore, GATT Article XVI states

restraints on export subsidies by requiring the

"contracting parties

[to]

seek to avoid the use of

subsidies on the export of primary products,
however,

a

"^^

If,

contracting party grants export subsidies on

primary products, its obligation is set out in
^'

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
(hereinafter GATT)

"

Id.

at art.

XVI.

^^

Id.

at art.

XVI

:

3

.

9

GATT Article XVI

which states that export subsidies on

:3,

primary products "shall not be applied in

manner which

a

results in that contracting party having more than an

equitable share of world export trade in that product.

"^°

With respect to subsidies on non-primary products,
GATT Article XVI

:

4

requires that "contracting parties

shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any

form of subsidy on the export of any product other than

a

primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at

a

price lower than the comparable

price charged for the like product to buyers in the

domestic market.

"^^

Thus GATT Articles XIV:

3

and XIV:

4

did

not directly prohibit subsidies but set out the mere

obligation to avoid and cease the use of subsidies.
Domestic subsidies were not addressed directly at all in
GATT Article XVI
A reference to domestic subsidies was made in the Report
of the Working Party on "Other Barriers to Trade",
in the 1954-1955 review session,

relating to the The

Nullification and Impairment of Benefits
(GATT Article XXIII)

20

^^

Id.
Id.

at art.

XVI

:

4

.

adopted

The Report stated that

10

so far as domestic subsidies are concerned,

agreed that

a

contracting party which has negotiated

concession under Article II may be assumed,
purpose of Article XXIII, to have
expectation,

it was

a

a

for the

reasonable

failing evidence to the contrary, that the

value of the concession will not be nullified or

impaired by the contracting party which granted the

concession by the subsequent introduction or increase of
a

domestic subsidy on the product concerned. ^^

That means that although domestic subsidies were not

prohibited under GATT Article XVI, they can constitute an
impairment of benefits accruing to

a

contracting party.

In a decision concerning subsidies paid to processors and

producers of oilseeds by the European Economic Community
the GATT Dispute Settlement Body

(Panel)

found

that benefits accruing to the United States under

Article II of the General Agreement in respect of the
zero tariff bindings for oilseeds in the Community

Schedule of Concessions were impaired as result of the

introduction of production subsidy schemes which operate
to protect Community producers of oilseeds completely

from the movement of prices of imports and thereby

prevent the tariff concessions from having any impact on
the competitive relationship between domestic and

imported oilseeds.

^"^

22

Review Reports, Report by the Working Party on "Other Barriers to
Trade", March 3, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. (3'^'' Supp.) at 222, 224 (1955).

^^

Decisions and Reports, Report by the Panel on "European Economic
Community - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers

11

The panel rejected the argument that since
"[GATT]

Articles 111:8

(b)

XVI

:

1

explicitly recognize the

right of contracting parties to grant production
subsidies,""'' there can be no impairment.

hand,

On the other

the panel agreed with a former decision concerning

subsidies on ammonium sulphate stating that

nothing in [GATT] Article

XXXIII

CONTRACTING PARTIES to require
withdraw or reduce

a

a

...

would empower the

contracting party to

consumption subsidy

....

The

ultimate power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under [GATT]

Article XXIII is that of authorizing an affected

contracting party to suspend the application of
appropriate obligations or concessions under the General

Agreement

^^
.

The GATT therefore provided no direct means to restrict
the use of domestic subsidies.

Besides the withdrawal of

concessions under GATT Article XXIII contracting parties
were authorized to respond to the use of

(domestic)

subsidies in the form of countervailing duties.
GATT Article VI deals with the imposition of antidumping
and countervailing duties under the GATT,

of Oilseeds and related Animal-Feed Proteins",
GATT B.I.S.D. (37'^'' Supp.) at 86, 132 (1991).

January 25,

1990,

^^

Id.

^^

Report of Working Parties, Report by the Panel on "The Australian
Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate", April 3, 1950, GATT B.I.S.D. (Vol.

at 128.

at 188,

195

(1952)

.

2]

12

GATT Article

VIM

defines "countervailing duty" as "a

special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any

bounty or subsidy bestowed, either directly or indirectly,
upon the manufacture, production or export of any

merchandise," and limits the amount of any countervailing
duty imposed by

contracting party to "an amount equal to

a

the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been

granted.

"^^

GATT Article VI:

6 (a)

establishes that

a

contracting

party may not impose countervailing duties on imports of
another contracting party unless it determines that the

subsidization "is such as to cause or threaten material
injury to an established domestic industry, or is such to
retard materially the establishment of
industry.

"^^

a

domestic

However, because GATT Article VI was subject

to grandfather rights,

this injury test did not apply to

the United States countervailing duty law because it

predated the adoption of the GATT and did not contain the
requirement of an injury test.

^^
^^

GATT,
Id.

supra note 17 at art. VI

at art.

VI:6(a)

.

:

4

13
C.

Tokyo Round Negotiations: The Svibsidies Code

These flaws of the original GATT were tried to be

eliminated by the negotiation of the Subsidies Code in the
Tokyo Round negotiations from 1974 through 1979.
Tokyo Round negotiations were aimed,

"inter alia,

The
to

...

reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or, where this is
to reduce or eliminate their trade

not appropriate,

restricting or distorting effects, and to bring such
measures under more effective international
discipline,
^^The

"^^
....

objective of the United States in the negotiations

was to strengthen the rules of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade

(GATT)

governing subsidy practices

.

"^^

The Report of the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade
Act of 1974^° set the goal:
In the long run.

United States interests will be best

served by an international agreement to eliminate

subsidies which distort world trade patterns and

discriminate against United States sales both at home
and abroad. Central to the forthcoming multilateral
^^

Decisions, Ministerial Meeting, September 1973, Declaration of
Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, GATT B.I.S.D.
Supp.

^^

)

at 19,

20

(20''*'

(1974)

Richard R. Rivers & John D. Greenwald, The Negotiations of Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Bridging Fundamental Policy
Differences, 11 Law & Pol' y in Int'l Bus. 1447, 1448 (1979).
:

14

negotiations should be the establishment of acceptable
"^^

international rules governing the use of subsidies
Most of the other participants negotiations,

.

however,

saw the use of subsidies expressly designed to stimulate

exports as strictly
policy.

a

question of national internal

According to this viewpoint, only when

country's trade or production was injured by

a

a

particular subsidy practice did that country have
legitimate ground to raise

a

concern.

Thus,

a

far from

needing stronger rules on subsidies, the problem, as
most MTN participants saw it, was to have the United
States accept discipline,

in the form of a material

injury test, over its countervailing duty action.
The Tokyo Round negotiations led to

a

^^

compromise between

the United States and other participants concerning

application of an injury test by the United States and the
recognition by the other participants that domestic
subsidies can have injurious effects and that

countervailing measures should be allowed against them.
The Subsidies Code sets up

disciplining subsidies.

a

Track

two-track approach to
I

deals entirely with

countervailing duties, establishing international rules on
what national government can do in implementing their

countervailing duty rules (including constraints on the
^°

Trade Act of 1974,

^^

S.

^^

Rivers

Rep.
&

No.

1298,

Greenwald,

Publ

.

L.

93d Cong.,

supra note

No.

93-618,

2d Sess.
2 9,

at

88 Stat.

183

1449.

(1974).

1978

(1975;

15

procedures for those cases) and defining what constitutes
a

material injury.

Track II of the Subsidies Code is

devoted to the substantive obligations under international
law regarding how governments should refrain from granting

subsidies that affect goods in international trade.
In Track

I

the Subsidies Code recognizes

a

Signatory's

right to impose countervailing duties on subsidized

imports that cause injury to its domestic producers.

Article 2:1 of the Subsidies Code sets out that
" [c]

ountervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to

investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with
the provisions of this Article.

An investigation to

determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged
subsidy shall normally be initiated upon
by or on behalf on an industry af f ected.

a

written request

"'^'^

In Track II the Subsidies Code sets out the obligations

of the Signatories concerning the use of subsidies.

Article 9:1 of the Subsidies Code states that
" [s]

ignatories shall not grant export subsidies other than

certain primary products."'^''
GATT Article XVI:

^^

SCM Agreement,

^^

Id.

at art.

4,

That goes beyond

which sets out the mere obligation to

supra note 10 at art. 2:1

9:1.

16

cease the grant of subsidies if they meet the bi-level

pricing condition.
In Article 10:1 of the Subsidies Code the Signatories

agreed "not to grant directly or indirectly any export

subsidy which results in the signatory granting such
subsidy having more than an equitable share of world
export in such product,

...."

The retention of differential treatment for primary and

non-primary products was due to large subsidies in the
agricultural sector that were

a

central part of the

European Communities Common Agricultural Policy^^.

In

further negotiations subsidies on agricultural products
were treated with separately.

Rules governing the use of export subsidies and the

imposition of countervailing measures were not the sole
focus of the Subsidies Code.

The Signatories recognized

in Article 11:1 of the Subsidies Code "that subsidies

other than export subsidies are widely used as important

instruments for the promotion of social and economic

policy objectives and do not intend to restrict the right
of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and

other important policy objectives which they consider

^^

See Rivers

&

Greenwald,

supra note

29

at 14

4!

17

desirable

.

"^^

recognized,

At the same time,

however,

the Signatories

"that subsidies other than export subsidies

may cause or threaten to cause injury to

industry of another signatory

....

a

...

domestic

Signatories shall

therefore seek to avoid causing such effects through the
use of subsidies

"^^
.

Thus the Subsidies Code did not accomplish an agreement
on the disciplining of domestic subsidies.

Furthermore,

the Subsidies Code did not contain a definition of a

subsidy, which led to confusion in imposing countervailing

measures, which may be levied only to offset subsidies.
In the United States,
(CIT)

the Court of International Trade

established the specificity test to determine when

government aid amounted to

a

subsidy'^^,

but the Subsidies

Code provided no direct guidelines in this respect.

The

Subsidies Code contained an illustrative list of export
subsidies in its annex indeed, but this list was not

exhaustive and gave only

a

hint when governmental aid is

specific enough to be subsidy:
-

"Signatories recognize that the objectives mentioned
in paragraph

^^

SCM Agreement,

^^

Id.

at art.

1

above [of Article 11 of the Subsidies

supra note 10 at art.

11:2.

11:1

a

li

Code]

inter alia, by means of

may be achieved,

subsidies granted with the aim of giving an advantage
of certain enterprises

"''°
.

"The provision by governments of direct subsidies to
a

firm or an industry contingent upon export

performance

^®

.

"^^

See Carlisle Tire and Rubber Company v. United States,
(1983)

40

SCM Agreement,

^^

Id.

at Annex (a)

supra note 10 at art.
.

11:3,

5

C.I.T. 229

III. The Uruguay Round:

The Agreement on Subsidies and

Countervailing Measures

Although the Subsidies Code was an important step toward
disabling nations from frustrating tariff concessions
through the use of non-tariff measures it still did not
contain

a

direct prohibition on domestic subsidies and,

more important

a

definition of

a

subsidy.

After

completion of the Tokyo Round, the new Subsidies Code was
subject to review and interpretation by the GATT Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures Committee.
the Subsidies Code were presented in

a

The weaknesses of

Note prepared by

the Secretariat for the subsidies negotiating group in the

Uruguay Round:
Divergent views have been expressed regarding the

question as to whether

a

financial contribution by

a

government should be one of the criteria for determining
the existence of a countervailable subsidy

....

Conflicting views have been put forward on the question
whether

a

necessary condition for the existence of

countervailable (domestic)

a

subsidy is that the practice

in question confers a net benefit to the recipient and

19

20

adversely affects the conditions of normal competition

The fundamental problem which has prevented the

signatories from reaching agreement on the methodology
to calculate the amount of a subsidy is the divergence
of views on the question whether the measure of the

amount of the subsidy is the cost to the government

providing that subsidy or the benefit of the recipient
of that subsidy.''^

These particular deficits concerning subsidies and much

more importantly the weakness of the GATT's dispute

settlement authority led in November 1985 to the

establishment of
objectives,

a

Preparatory Committee "to determine the

subject matter, modalities for and

participation in the multilateral trade negotiations
This round of negotiations,

...."^^

termed the Uruguay Round, was

launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986.
The major achievement of the Uruguay Round was the

Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization^'^,
which contained in its Annex the Agreement on Subsidies

^"

Problems in the Area of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note
by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. No. MTN. GNG/NGlO/W/3 (March 17, 1987).

^^

Decision of 28 November 1985 on Establishment of the Preparatory
Committee, GATT B.I.S.D. (32"'' Supp.) at 10 (1986).

''''

Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and related Agreements, April 15, 1994, Uruguay Round Agreement Act,
PL 103-465, sec. 101(d)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, reprinted in John H
Jackson et al., 1995 Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of International
Economic Relations, 3 (3"'^ ed. 1995)
.

21

Unlike the 1979 Tokyo Round

and Countervailing Measures''^.

Subsidies Code, which only 24 countries joined,

all

countries that become members of the WTO automatically
The SCM Agreement

become members of the SCM Agreement.

addresses two separate but closely related topics:

Multilateral disciplines regulating the provision of
subsidies,

and the use of countervailing measures to

offset injury caused by subsidized imports.

Multilateral

disciplines are the rules regarding whether or not
subsidy may be provided by

a

a

They are enforced

Member.

through invocation of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.

Countervailing duties are an unilateral

instrument, which may be applied by

investigation by that Member and

a

a

Member after an

determination that the

criteria set forth in the SCM Agreement are satisfied.

A.

Definition of a sxibsidy

Unlike the Subsidies Code, the SCM Agreement contains

definition of the term subsidy.
Agreement requires two elements:

^^

See SCM Agreement,

supra note 10

Article
(1)

a

1

of the SCM

"financial

a

22

contribution by

government or any public body"''^ within

a

that government's territory and

(2)

the conferral of a

"benefit"^\
Four categories of practices that constitute

contribution are specified in Article 1.1(a)
Agreement:
loans,

"a direct transfer of funds

(1)

and equity infusions

"^^
)

(1)

financial

of the SCM

(e.g.,

grants,

or "potential direct

transfers of funds or liabilities
guarantees)"''^;

a

(e.g.,

loan

"government revenue otherwise due that

(2)

is foregone or not collected

as tax credits) "^°;

(e.g.,

fiscal incentives such

government provision of goods and

(3)

services other than general infrastructure^^.

The fourth

category is directed against the circumvention of the
rules.

Article 1.1(a)

clear that

a

(1) (iv)

of the SCM Agreement makes

financial contribution can exist where,

rather than acting directly, "a government makes payments
to a funding mechanism,

or entrusts or directs a private

body to carry out one or more of the type of functions
[described]

above,

"^

Id.

at art.

1.1(a)

"^

Id.

at art.

1.1

at art.

1.1(a)

''

Id.

^°

Id.

^^

See Id. at art.

which normally would' be vested in the

(1'

(a) (1) (i)

1

.

.

(1) (11)
1 (a)

(

1

)

.

(iii)

.
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government,

and the practice,

in no real sense,

differs

from practices normally followed by governments."
Thus,

the SCM Agreement solved the dispute over the

concept of

'financial contribution' by adopting the

approach that there could be no subsidy unless there was
charge on the public account.

a

Other forms of government

intervention that do not involve expense to the government
do not constitute a subsidy.

The other point of

controversy, whether the existence of

assessed with reference to

a

a

benefit should be

commercial benchmark

(benef it-to-the-recipient methodology)

or with reference

to the cost to the subsidizing government

(cost-to-the-

government standard) was not solved in favour of one of
the approaches. The cost-to-the-government standard is

used to calculate the amount of subsidies regarding the

threshold of an actionable subsidy, whereas the benefit-

to-the-recipient standard is used to calculate the amount
of subsidies in countervailing duty proceedings.

^^

Id.

at art.

1.1(a)

(1) (iv)

.
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Specificity

B.

After the Uruguay Round,

for the first time specificity

was made a requirement under the GATT

.

Assuming that

a

subsidy within the meaning of the SCM

measure is

a

Agreement,

it nevertheless is not subject to the SCM

Agreement unless it has been specifically provided to an

enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
industries.

The basic principle is that

a

subsidy that

distorts the allocation of resources within an economy
should be subject to discipline.

Where

widely available within an economy, such

subsidy is

a
a

distortion in

the allocation of resources is presumed not to occur.
Thus,

only ^specific'

subsidies are subject to SCM

Agreement disciplines.
Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement sets out de jure and de
facto grounds to determine the specificity of

a

subsidy.

Article 2.1(a) of the SCM Agreement provides that

a

subsidy shall be specific "[w]here the granting authority
...

explicitly limits access to

enterprises."^"^

a

subsidy to certain

That means on the other hand, as

Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement lays down, that

"

Id.

at art.

2.1

(al
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"[w]here the granting authority

...

establishes objective

criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and
the amount of,

subsidy,

a

specificity shall not exist

...."^''

Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement provides that

notwithstanding the absence of de jure grounds for

a

finding of specificity, where there are reasons to believe
that the subsidy may in fact be specific,

They are:

may be considered.

program by

a

(1)

other factors

the ''use of a subsidy

limited number of certain enterprises"^^

(industry specificity);

(2)

the "predominant use by

certain enterprises"^^ (enterprise-specificity);

(3)

"the

granting of disproportionately large amounts to certain
enterprises"^^;

and

(4)

"the manner in which discretion

has been exercised by the granting authority in the

decision to grant

a

subsidy.

"^^

Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement provides that

prohibited subsidies according to Article

2

of the SCM

Agreement are automatically deemed to be specif ic.^^
Recognizing the federal structure of some Signatories,

^''

"

Id.

at art.

2.1(b)

Id.

at art.

2.1

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

^^

See id. at art.

.

(c)

2.3,
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Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement provides that central
government subsidies limited to

a

region are specific,

even if generally available throughout the region.

*'°

means on the other hand that subsidies granted by

a

That
state

or province on a generally available basis within a state

or province

within

a

(i.e.,

not limited to certain enterprises

state or province)

are not specific.

The purpose of the specificity test is to function as an

initial screening mechanism to winnow out only those
foreign subsidies with truly are broadly available and

widely used throughout an economy.

The application of the

specificity test in United States countervailing duty law
will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this thesis.

C.

Classes of Subsidies

Articles

3

to

9

of the SCM Agreement establish a three-

class framework for the categorization of subsidies and

subsidy remedies:
'red light'

(1)

category);

subsidies that are prohibited (the
(2)

subsidies that may be

challenged in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and

domestically countervailed if they cause adverse trade
^°

See id.

at art.

2.2
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effects

'yellow light'

(the

and

amber');

including 'dark

category,

subsidies that are non-actionable and

(3)

non-countervailable if they are structured according to
criteria intended to limit their potential for causing
trade distortions
The

(the

'traffic light'

suggestion at
February

a

1988.^'^

'green light'

category)

framework was adopted from

a

Swiss

meeting of the negotiating group in

Switzerland proposed to "redefine

existing categories and to introduce three different
classes of subsidies:

prohibited subsidies, actionable

subsidies and non-actionable subsidies

1.

.

"^^

Prohibited ('Red Light') Subsidies

Article

3

of the SCM Agreement lists two categories of

subsidies that are prohibited under all circumstances.
The first is "subsidies contingent,

in law or in fact,

whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon
export performance

..."^^

(export subsidies)

A detailed

.

" See Meeting of 1-3 February 1988, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc,
Nr. MTN.GNG/NGlO/6 (Feb. 15, 1988).
^^

Communication from Switzerland, GATT Doc. No. MTN GNG/NGlO/W/17
.

(Feb.
63

1,

1988)

SCM Agreement,

,

at 1-2.

supra note 10 at art.

3.1

(a;
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list of export subsidies is annexed to the SCM Agreement

64

The second is "subsidies contingent, whether solely or as
one of several other conditions,

over imported goods"^^

upon the use of domestic

(local content subsidies).

These

two categories of subsidies are prohibited because they

are designed to affect trade and thus are most likely to

have adverse effects on the interests of other members.
The scope of these prohibitions is relatively narrow.

Developed countries had already accepted the prohibition
on export subsidies under the Subsidies Code,

and the

local content subsidies of the type prohibited by the SCM

Agreement were inconsistent with the National Treatment
Clause in GATT Article 111:1, which provided that "[t]he

products of the territory of any contracting party

imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that

accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws,

regulations and requirements affecting their

internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,

transportation, distribution or use."^^

What is most

significant about the SCM Agreement concerning export

*^

"

See id. at Annex
Id.

at art.

3.1

1.

(b)

" GATT, supra note

17 at art.

111:4
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subsidies is the extension of the obligations to

developing country Members in accordance with specified
transition rules, as well as the creation in Article
the SCM Agreement of a rapid

(three-month)

4

of

dispute

settlement mechanism for complaints regarding prohibited
subsidies.

^^

All that must be established is the existence

of a prohibited subsidy.

finds that

subsidy,

a

If a panel or the Appellate Body

government is maintaining

a

prohibited

the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO must

authorize countermeasures if the subsidy is not withdrawn

expeditiously

Actionable ('Yellow Light' and 'Dark Amber')

2.

Subsidies

Most subsidies, such as production subsidies fall into
the

'actionable'

prohibited.

category.

Actionable subsidies are not

However, they are subject to challenge,

either through multilateral dispute settlement or through

countervailing action, in the event that they cause
adverse effects to the interests of another Member.

^~'

See SCM Agreement,

supra note 10 at art.

4.
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Article

5

of the SCM Agreement sets out three types of

adverse effects:
"(a)

injury to the domestic industry of another Member;

(b)

nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
directly or indirectly to other [WTO] Members

(c)

...;

serious prejudice to the interests of another
Member.

"^^

Unlike the Subsidies Code, Article

6

of the SCM

Agreement defines the term ^serious prejudice'.
improvement to the Subsidies Code is that
prejudice'

cannot only arise as

a

A major

^serious

result of adverse

effects in the market of the importing Member but also in
a

third country market.

Article 6.3(b)

of the SCM

Agreement provides that "[sjerious prejudice
in any case where

...

may arise

the effect of the subsidy is to

displace or impede the exports of
another Member from

...

a

a

like product in

third country market.

"^^

The SCM Agreement refers to two kinds of actionable

subsidies against which action can be taken in the WTO or
in domestic countervailing duty proceedings if adverse

effects are established by an effected Member.

The first

type are those dealt with by the SCM Agreement as

^^

Id.

at art.

6.

^^

Id.

at art.

6.3

(b)

.
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prohibited or non-actionable subsidies and for which,
the case of

a

serious prejudice, non-exhaustive examples

are provided in Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.

second type

in

(termed

Mark amber' subsidies), listed

The
in

Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement, are presumed to cause
Where serious prejudice is presumed.

serious prejudice.

Article 6.2 of the SCM Agreement places the burden on the

subsidizing government to demonstrate that serious

prejudice did not result from the subsidization in
question.
"(a)

The four

the total ad valorem subsidization of a product

exceeding
(b)

Mark amber' subsidies are:

5

per cent;

subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an
industry;

(c)

subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an
enterprise, other than one-time measures which are

non-recurrent and cannot by repeated for that
enterprise and which are given merely to provide
time for the development of long-term solutions and
to avoid acute social problems;
(d)

^°

Id.

direct forgiveness of debt

at art.

6.1

...."^°
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Annex IV of the SCM Agreement sets forth general rules

governing how

a

complaining member is to calculate the

total ad valorem subsidization of
of showing whether the

6.1(a)

5

a

product for purposes

per cent threshold of Article

of the SCM Agreement has been reached.

The most

fundamental of the general rules set forth in Annex IV is
the broad statement in Paragraph

that the ad valorem

1

calculation must be based on the cost-to-the-government

measurement standard.

Annex IV Paragraph

1

of the SCM

Agreement provides that "[a]ny calculation of the amount
of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph 1(a)
6

of Article

shall be done in terms of the cost to the granting

government

"^"^
.

That causes

a

number of problems since the cost-to-the-

government standard is not further explained in the SCM

Agreement in contrary to Article

14

of the SCM,

which

endorses the benef it-to-the-recipient standard for use in

countervailing duty proceedings.

Further questions are

whether the overall rate of subsidization should be

calculated separately for each benefiting company or
whether the overall rate of subsidization must be

calculated as an aggregate for all benefiting companies.

Id.

at Annex IV,

§

1.
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The other problem is whether Red Light subsidies should be

included in the calculation of the overall rate of

subsidization
Remedies against actionable subsidies are laid out in

Article

7

of the SCM Agreement.

consultations regarding such

a

Once

a

subsidy,

Member requests
the SCM Agreement

allots 180 days for completion of the panel proceedings
and the issuance of

decision by the Dispute Settlement

a

The SCM Agreement provides an additional 60 days

Body.

for appeals of panel findings.

The Dispute Settlement

Body must authorize countermeasures where

either withdrawn

a

a

Member has not

subsidy found to be causing serious

prejudice or eliminated its adverse effects within six
months

3.

Non-Actionable

(

^

Green Light') Siibsidies

The SCM Agreement accords non-actionable,
Light',

or

^Green

status to three narrow types of subsidies.

That

means those subsidies cannot be challenged multilaterally
or be subject to countervailing action.

These subsidies

presumably are protected either because they are
considered extremely unlikely to cause adverse effects or

34

because they are considered to be of particular value and
not to be discouraged.

Article

8

of the SCM Agreement

provides for three types of non-actionable subsidies:
(a)

basic research and pre-competitive development

subsidies

^^
;

(b)

assistance to disadvantaged

(c)

assistance to adapt existing facilities to new

environmental requirements.
Under Article 8.2(a)

regions;"^"^

"^

of the SCM Agreement,

government

assistance for research activities conducted by firms, or
by higher education or research establishments on

a

contract basis with firms,

is non-actionable if the

assistance does not exceed

a

designated proportion of

project costs and is only used for certain expenditures.
Under Article 8.2(b)

of the SCM Agreement,

government

assistance to disadvantaged regions is non-actionable if
it is not limited to specific enterprises or industries

within the region, given pursuant to

a

general scheme of

regional development, and the region is disadvantaged by

comparison with the Member as

^'

See id. at art.

8.2(a)

^^

See id. at art.

8.2

'"^

See id. at art.

8.2(c)

(b)

a

whole in terms of

35

objective criteria such as GNP per capita and

unemployment
Under Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement, government

assistance for environmental adaptation is considered

permissible if it is given on

a

one-time basis, limited to

20 per cent of adaptation cosrs,

and available to all

firms which can adopt the new equipment and processes.

D.

Rules regarding countervailing duty proceedings

Articles 10 through 23

(Part V)

of the SCM Agreement

establish rules for domestic countervailing duty
proceedings.

Part V of the SCM Agreement sets forth

certain substantive requiremenrs zhaz
order to impose

a

rr.usi:

m

be fulfilled

countervailing measure, as well as in-

depth procedural requirements regarding the conduct of

a

countervailing investigation and the im.position ana

maintenance in place of countervailing measures.

A

failure to respect either the substantive or procedural

requirements of Part V can be taken to dispute settlement
and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure.
A Member may not impose

a

countervailing measure unless

it determines that there are subsidized imports,

injury to

36
a

domestic industry and

a

causal link between the

subsidized imports and the injury.
As laid out in Chapter III.B of this thesis,

a

subsidy

is countervailable only if it is specific.

This thesis

focuses in Chapter IV on this first step of

a

countervailing measure procedure, in particular how the
specificity test is implemented in U.S. domestic

countervailing duty law.
Part V of the SCM Agreement furthermore contains

detailed rules regarding the initiation and conduct of

countervailing investigations, the imposition of

preliminary and final measures, the use of undertakings,
and the duration of measures.

IV.

U.S. Legislation

The Uruguay Round Agreements Act implemented the SCM

Agreement into U.S. countervailing duty law.

The Uruguay

^

Round Agreements Act did not alter the procedure that had
been imposed by The Trade Agreements Act of 1979.''^
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 imposed
that must be satisfied before

used against

a

Member.

a

a

two-step test

countervailing duty can be

The first step requires that the

Commerce Department determines whether

a

exists.

the International

Then,

Trade Commission
been

a

if there is a subsidy,

subsidy even

(ITC)^^ must determine whether there has

material injury to an U.S. industry.

"^^

Chapter IV of this thesis focuses on the first step of
this test,

the determination of the existence of a

subsidy.

''^

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).

'^^

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). This law
was passed in response to the Tokyo Round of the GATT.

''''

See The Act sec.

'^^

Hereinafter ITC.

^^

See The Act sec.

702,

19 U.S.C.A.

§

1671a

(West Supp.

1998).

703,

19 U.S.C.A.

§

1671b (West Supp.

1998).
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Basic Definition

Section 771(5)

of the Act provides the basic

(A)

definition of the terms
subsidy'

^subsidy'

^countervailable

and

The systematic of the provision is to provide

.

definition of

a

subsidy according to Article

SCM Agreement in section 771(5)

restrict in section 771

(5A)

1

a

of the

of The Act and to

(B)

of the Act the admissibility

of countervailing measures to subsidies that are specific

according to Article

2

of the SCM Agreement.

With respect to the term subsidy,

section 771(5)

the Act tracks the language of Article

1

(B)

of

of the SCM

It provides that a subsidy exists where "a

Agreement.

government of

a

country or any public entity within the

territory of the country"^°
"(i)

provides

(ii)

provides any form of income or price support

a

financial contribution,

within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT

(iii)

1994,

or

makes

a

payment to

a

funding mechanism to provide

a

financial contribution, or entrusts or directs

a

private entity to make

a

financial

contribution, of providing the contribution
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would normally be vested in the government and
the practice does not differ in substance from

practices normally followed by governments,
The definition of

financial contribution is to be

a

found in Section 771(5)

language of Article

1

(D)

of The Act,

771(5)

(B) (iii)

(1) (iv)

which tracks the

of the SCM Agreement.

issue in determining whether

Article 1.1(a)

...,"®^

a

A problematic

subsidy exists is whether

of the SCM Agreement and Section

of the Act encompass indirect subsidy

practices
Those practices can vary widely but one practice

appeared frequently in the past, which does not seem to
fall in one of the prongs of the definition.

These cases

involved export restraints that artificially raised the

domestic supply of

a

certain good.

In Leather from Argentina

issued

a

,

the Department of Commerce

Countervailing Duty Order to offset subsidies

that were conferred to manufacturers, producers,

exporters in Argentina of leather.^"

In 1972,

or

the

Government of Argentina implemented an embargo on the
export of cattle hides.

^°

The Act sec.

"

Id.

771(5(B),

The Department of Commerce found

19 U.S.C.A.

§

1677(5)

(B)

(West Supp.

1998).
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that prices for cattle hides in Argentina were

considerable lower when the embargo was in

f orce

^"^
,

The

lower price for cattle hide in Argentina benefited

domestic producers of leather but was not directly caused
by the embargo but by the higher supply.

The Department

of Commerce determined that the Argentina cattle hide

embargo is countervailable nonetheless, because there was
"a cognizable and discernible link between the Argentina

hide embargo" and the low domestic price for cattle hide.^''
The rationale underlying that determination was that the

export embargo "caused hide prices to be lower than they

would have been absent the embargo" and, thereby, enabled
the leather tanners to sell the finished product,
at a lower price.

leather,

^^

Mirect and discernible effect' standard was

The

reapplied in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada.

^^

This case involved the practice of Log Export

Restrictions

^^

(LERs)^''

used by the Government of British

See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and
Countervailing Duty Order;
Leather from Argentina, 55 Fed. Reg.

40,212

(1990).

"

Id.

at 40,213.

^^

Id.

at 40,214.

^^

Id.

at

^^

Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination:
Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22570 (1992).

^^

Hereinafter LER.

40,213.
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Columbia/^

The issue in Certain Softwood Lumber Products

from Canada was the same as in Leather from Argentina

since the government of British Columbia did not maintain

direct control over the log prices though the imposition
of its export restrictions.

But the Department of

Commerce found also in this case that the indirect scheme
had the effect of reducing the production costs of British

Therefore the

Columbia softwood lumber manufacturers.

LERs had "a direct and discernible effect upon the British

This controversy
The Lumber Case dragged on for over twelve years.
originally arose as a result of a Canadian 'stumpage pricing'
policy, under which timber on government-owned lands is sold to
private Canadian companies that pay a ^stumpage price' for the right
In 1983, in response to a petition from a coalition
to harvest it.
of U.S. lumber producers, the Commerce Department found these
practices not to be countervailable (Final Negative Countervailing
Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed.
Duty Determinations;
When the coalition petitioned again in 1986,
Reg. 24159 (1983)).
the Commerce Department reversed its previous findings and held in a
preliminary determination that the stumpage system was a
countervailable subsidy (Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51
Determination:
Canada responded quickly with an offer
Fed. Reg. 37453-02 (1986)).
of implementing a 15% export tax on all lumber in exchange for an
agreement not to impose a countervailing duty.
The Commerce
Department agreed and declared that the preliminary finding was
without effect, and the deal was finalized in a Memorandum of
Understanding (See Memorandum, Determination under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. 233 (1986)
In 1991, Canada
terminated the Agreement and the Department of Commerce initiated a
countervailing duty investigation (Self-Initiation of Countervailing
Duty Investigation:
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
56 Fed. Reg. 56055 (1991)).
Included in the investigation was a new
complaint about the practice of LERs in British Columbia.
In 1992,
the Commerce Department issued a final determination and imposed a
countervailing duty based on both the stumpage practices and the LER
System (Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, supra note
The Commerce Department found that the stumpage system did
86)
benefit specific producers with preferential rates.
It also found
that the LERs are subsidies within the meaning of Section 771(5) (A)
of The Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (A) (1991) (current version at 19
U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (A) (West Supp. 1998)).
.

.

42

Columbia domestic price of logs and,

confer

thereby,

a

benefit upon British Columbia softwood lumber

manufacturers
The

...."^

^cognizable and discernable effect'

standard is

supported in legal respect by GATT Article VI
GATT Article VI
granted,

:

:

3

refers to subsidies that "have been

3

directly or indirectly, on the manufacture,

production or export of

...

product.

[a]

"^°

That means that

the words "entrusts or directs a private party"^'^ in

Article 1.1

(iv)

of the SCM Agreement have to be

interpreted broadly to cover governmental actions that
have indirect effects through

a

private body.

In practical respect the standard is supported by the

necessity to prevent the circumvention of the SCM
Agreement.

The standard is

determine whether

a

a

reasonable means to

measure has

a

direct effect on the

price of the input product, in the foregoing cases raw
hides and unprocessed lumber, even though the effect upon
the processed product,

indirect.

leather and processed lumber,

is

The requirement of the existence of a

Miscernable link' between the measure and the result
®^

Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
22610.

'°

'^

GATT,

supra note 17,

SCM Agreement,

at art.

supra note 10,

VI

:

3

at art.

l.l(iv).

supra note 86,

at
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secures that only those measures are countervailable that

constitute

financial contribution within the meaning of

a

Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement.

B.

Specificity

Section 771

Article

2

(5A)

of The Act implements the provision of

of the SCM Agreement dealing with specificity.

The specificity requirement ensures that programs

conferring

a

broad,

countervailable.

generalized benefit are not
roads and schools for

For example,

public use or tax credits available to all companies
confer

a

generalized benefit and are thus not

countervailable.

On the other hand, programs that favor

one or more market participants and are capable of

distorting the relative allocation of resources to
different sectors

a

country's economy, or are

potentially trade distorting, are specific benefits.

^^

Three policy goals underlie the specificity test.
First,

the test supposedly serves as a practical

limit on the number of possible claims United States

industries can bring against subsidies in foreign
countries.

Such

a

practical limit

...

is needed because

all industries in every country receive some direct or

indirect government benefits.

92

John A. Ragosta

...

& Howard M.
Schanker, Specificity of a Subsidy in
U.S. Department of Commerce Countervailing Duty Determinations, 25
Law & Pol'y Int' l Bus. 639, 641 (1994) (Internal citations omitted).
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Second,

some scholars maintain that the specificity

test minimizes the distortive effects of countervailing

duties by separating subsidies which distort economic
The economic theory

efficiency form those that do not.

of comparative advantage suggests that gains from

international trade are maximized when countries export
goods that they can produce relatively more efficiently

than producers in other countries and import goods that

other countries can produce more efficiently.

A

specific subsidy supposedly misallocates resources away
from

a

country'

s

inefficient ones,

efficient industries into its

thereby raising prices for importers

of the affected products.

Finally,

...

the specificity test is based on notions of

fairness regarding the appropriate role for government
in the economy. United States producers generally

consider it unfair to have to compete against foreign
rivals run or propped by their governments when at home

United States producers must follow the ^survival of the
most efficient' rule of free competition.^"^

Although the specificity requirement was added to an
international agreement only in 1994 with the adoption of
the SCM Agreement after the Uruguay Round,

countervailing duty law contained
1979.

a

U.S.

specificity test since

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979^^ added a

specificity test into Section 771 of The Act, which was in
^^

James D. Southwick, The Lingering Problem with the Specificity Test
in United States Countervailing Duty Law, 72 Minn. L.Rev. 1159, 1173
(1988)

.
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force until 1994,

when it was changed by the Uruguay

Rounds Agreements

Act"*''.

read:

''In

The old Section 771(B)

applying subparagraph

(A)

of The Act

[which defines the

the administering authority {The Department

term subsidy],

shall determine whether the bounty,

of Commerce],

grant,

or subsidy in law or in fact is provided to a specific

enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries.
of the law,

bounty,
not

a

Nominal general availability, under the terms

regulation or program, or rule establishing

grant,

or subsidy,

a

of the benefits thereunder is

basis for determining that the bounty,

subsidy is not, or has not been,

grant,

or

in fact provided to a

specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof."'*'

Based on the statutory definition of

a

domestic subsidy,

the Department of Commerce and the United States Court of

International Trade^^

determine whether

domestic subsidy.

a

(CIT)

developed

a

specificity test to

government program constitutes

a

The specificity test states that only a

government program conferring benefits on specific

^^

^

^'

See The Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act,

supra not 76.

supra note 75.

The Act sec. 771(5) (B), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (B) (1990)
version 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677 (5A) (West Supp 1998)).
.

" Hereinafter CIT.

(current
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enterprises or industries is

domestic subsidy

a

/^^

Thus,

a

government program generally available to many or all

domestic subsidy giving

producers in the country is not

a

rise to countervailing duties.

These of court decisions

still serve as guidelines in the interpretation of the new

Section 771
771

(5) (B)

(5A)

of the Act,

which replaced Section

of the Act.

In Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co.

was decided in 1983,
a

v.

United States, which

the CIT found the specificity test to

reasonable interpretation of the statute.'""

In this case

the Department of Commerce had determined that a generally

available Korean tax law permitting accelerated

depreciation that benefited

manufacturer was not

a

a

particular Korean

bounty or grant. "^°°

The CIT noted

that application of a broad definition of bounty or grant

would lead to the "absurd result" that almost all imports
could be countervailed,

a

result that would create an

overwhelming administrative burden and make impossible the

Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, supra note 39
(upholding Department of Commerce's determination that a government
program was not a subsidy within the meaning of countervailing duty
law unless conferring a benefit upon a specific enterprise or
industry); Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 C.I.T. 489 (1985)
(holding that a government program is not countervailable unless it
bestows a benefit on a specific class of industries), appeal
dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986); PPG Industries v. United
States, 11 C.I.T. 344 (1987) (same holding).
^'

^°°

See Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States,
Id.

at 230,

231.

supra note 39.

—^ —

qfCTezmr-^" ~
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The first case to consider directly the validity of the

specificity test was Bethlehem Steel Corp.
States. ^^^

In this case,

v.

United

the South African government

permitted companies to deduct 200 percent of their
employee training program expenses from their income,

benefit the Department of Commerce held not to be
or grand based on its general availability

"^'^'^
.

a

a

bounty

The CIT

upheld the specificity test in regard to tax provisions,
but,

rule,

in dicta,

the CIT rejected the rationale "that,

generally available benefits are not subsidies

as a
"^°''
.

The CIT asked the rhetorical question whether it can "be

argued that financial assistance that is inconsistent with

commercial considerations it no longer
is part of the basic

to all businesses [.]

policy of
"^'"'*^

a

a

subsidy when it

government and available

In doing so the CIT purported a

case-by-case approach:
In this decision the Court does not feel it is necessary

to speak to a variety of practices which are not before

the Court.

It does not see the alternatives as

being

either the absurd assessment of countervailing duties on
all beneficial acts of government or the exclusion from

the effect of the law of all benefits which are

^°^

See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States,

^°^

See id. at 340.

^°''

Id.

at 341.

'''

Id.

at 345.

7

C.I.T.

339

(1984
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generally available in

a

have their absurdities.

Both these extremes

country.

The Court does not enter intro

broad policy formulations based on general economic
tendencies

in.

the world.

In the early phases of the

interpretation of difficult concepts of legislation
j_c:

bss" ~c

"issc

^"wiciicial

"'""s

rss'-i_~5

rcc"wLssci

en

"ine

immediate factual pattern =rising in each particular
case

'"^
.

Those cases present two divergent approaches tc the

application of 'bounty or grant'.
On the one hand, Bethleher. Steel
~, £N

—^

V- ^-V

•

administers,

-

...

a^a^ve little

I

finding the countervailing duty

of whether they are preferential or not.

it considers a reastnarle ITA

a

Cn the

i:

domestic benefits are cnly
a

prefere:

specific economic sector or subsectcr."

Despite this diveraent approaches bcth thecries
common that the effect and the intent behind
to be examined.

Id.

at 350

th{

case law and

countervailable when they are applied in
basis tc

t:

mterpretaticn if

statute based on legislative histcry,

economic analysis:

lav."

a

ha^>

benefi

...

it
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In Cabot Corp.

part test:

v.

United States the CIT created

whether

first,

a

advantage'

."^^"^

a

benefit,

two-

benefit actually accrues to

i.e.,

a

second, whether the

specific industrial beneficiary;

benefit confers

a

a

'competitive

This case arose out of Mexico's National

Industrial Development Plan, which, utilizing incentives
such as tax rebates,

low interest loans and favorable

energy rates, set investment priorities among industrial

activities and geographic regions.^"

The government of

Mexico made carbon black feedstock available to its
producers at well below world market prices;

although the

world market cost of petroleum feedstock was USD 26 per
barrel,

the Mexican government made petroleum feedstock

available to Mexican producers at USD

2

per barrel

. '^'^"^

Through the application of the specificity test, the

Department of Commerce did not consider the Mexican
natural resource subsidies to be countervailable

"^''
.

The

CIT overturned the Department of Commerce's decision and

^^°

Michael J. Sussmann, Countervailing Duties and the Specificity
Test:
An Alternative Approach to the Definition of 'Bounty or
Grant', 18 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 475, 4 94 (1986).

"^ See Cabot Corp.

"^ See id.

v.

United States,

at 490.

^" See id.
"^

See id.

at 490,

491,

495.

9

C.I.T.

489

(1985).
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found that this aspect of the Mexican National Industrial

Development Plan constituted

a

subsidy.

^^^

The CIT found that the Department of Commerce had

applied an incorrect legal standard, holding that when

a

government program, nominally available to all industries,
only works to confer
industries,

a

benefit on specific enterprises or

the program meets the test for a

countervailable subsidy

"'•"'•^

.

Thus the CIT distinguished

between nominally and actually generally available
subsidies
The distinction that has evaded the ITA is not all so-

called generally available benefits are alike

-

some are

benefits accruing generally to all citizens, while
others are benefits that when actually conferred accrue
to specific individuals or classes.

true that

a

Thus,

while it is

generalized benefit provided by government,

such as national defense,

education or infrastructure,

is not a countervailable bounty or grant or grant,

generally available benefit

-

a

one that may be obtained

by any and all enterprises or industries - may

nevertheless accrue to specific recipients.

General

benefits are not conferred upon any specific individuals
or classes, while generally available benefits, when

actually bestowed, may constitute specific grants

^^-

See id.

^^'^

See id. at 498.

at 491.
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conferred upon specific identifiable entities, which

would be subject to countervailing duties.

^^''

The CIT then went on in developing the two-part test:
[The first inquiry is]

whether

a

benefit or 'competitive

advantage' has been actually conferred on

'specific

a

enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries.'

In the case before the Court,

the

availability of carbon black feedstock and natural gas
at controlled prices does not determine whether the

benefits actually received by these two carbon black

producers are countervailable subsidies.
been determined that there has been

specific class,

a

...

Once it has

bestowal upon

a

the second aspect of the definition of

bounty or grant requires looking at the bestowal and

determining if it amounts to an additional benefit or
competitive advantage

"^"^^
.

the two-part test is an inquiry into the issue

Thus,

whether an available benefit has an actual effect on the
beneficiary.

Thereby the CIT added to the specificity

test the element of de-facto specificity.
This approach was reaffirmed in PPG Industries
States.

-^-^^

PPG Industries

v.

v.

United

United States involved the

Fund for Promotion of Exports of Mexican Manufactured
Products.
^^'

Id.

at 497

^^^

Id.

at 498

The ITA determined that the Mexican
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government's sale of natural gas to Mexican float glass
producers at below world market prices did not amount to

a

countervailable subsidy because the natural gas was
generally available to all Mexican industries /^°

The CIT

upheld the Department of Commerce's finding that "the
float glass paid the published price for natural gas that
was available to all industries and therefore received no

countervailable benefit.

"^^^

The CIT stated that "the

appropriate standard or test requires the agency to
conduct

a de

facto case analysis to determine whether or

not a program provides
to a

a

'subsidy' or a 'bounty or grant'

'specific enterprise or industry, or group of

enterprises or industries.'"^""

"PPG Industries thus

clarified the Cabot rule to mean that when

a

government

program is nominally generally available and in fact
widely used, the program is not

a

countervailable

subsidy."^"

"'
^^°

See PPG Industries v. United States,

344

(1987).

See Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico; Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 23097, 23099-100 (1984)

^^^

PPG Industries v. United States,

^^^

Id.

^^^

11 C.I.T.

at 361,

supra note 119, at 631.

362.

James D. Southwick, The lingering Problem with the Specificity Test
in United States Countervailing Duty Law, 72 Minn. L.Rev. 1159, 1172
(1988)
.
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Section 771

of The Tariff Act of 1930

(5A) (D)

As stated above Section 771 (5A)

(D)

of The Act replaced

of the Act and is far more detailed

Section 771(B)

concerning the specificity of domestic subsidies.

The

statute provides definitions of de-jure and de-facto
specificity, with which the standards under which the ITA

conducts countervailing duty investigations have to be

reconciled

1.

Specific Enterprise or Industry

The specificity test as laid out in Section 771 (5A)

(D)

of The Act refers to the access of an industry or

enterprise to

a

subsidy

.

'^^'^

Whereas the definition of the term 'enterprise' causes
no difficulties there is no definition of the term

'industry'.

As the Department of Commerce stated in

Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,

"there is

realm of acceptable definitions of the terms
'

industry .'

124

^^^

""^^^

In this case,

3gg 3g^_ 771(5B(D)
Supp. 1998)

of The Act,

the Department of Commerce

19 U.S.C.A.

§

Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
22584

1677(5A)(D)

(West

supra note 86,

at

a
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explicitly rejected the contention that product based
descriptions were applicable, or even helpful, in defining
the applicable industry or group.

'^^^

Similarly,

Fresh Cut Flowers from the Netherlands

,

in Certain

the Department of

Commerce explicitly rejected the argument that benefits

provided to the horticulture and greenhouse industries
were too broad to be considered specific because they were

provided to more than sixty different categories of
products
apply

a

^^'^
.

The Department of Commerce thereby tends to

common sense definition of industry based upon

practical experience and common usage.
Since the Department of Commerce is elusive in providing
a

concrete definition of what constitutes an industry,

more specific definition should be formulated.

a

A

definition could consider such criteria as common
products,

common unions, and common input.

De-jure Specificity

Sections 771

Id.
^^"'

at 22584,

(5A) (D) (i)

and

(ii)

of The Act cover de

22585,

Final Affirmative Countervailing
Cc
Duty Determination: Certain Fresh
Cut Flowers from the Netherlands, 52 Fed. Reg. 3301, 3312 (1987
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jure-specif icity and track the language of Articles 2,1
and

(b)

(a)

of the SCM Agreement.

Clause

(i)

provides that specificity exists where

government expressly limits eligibility for

a

a

subsidy to

an enterprise or industry.'^

Clause
clause

is a corollary of the de jure test.

(ii)

(ii),

a

Under

subsidy would not be deemed to be de jure

specific merely it was bestowed pursuant to certain
the eligibility criteria

However,

eligibility criteria.

or conditions must be objective,

clearly documented,

capable of verification, and strictly followed.

In

addition, eligibility for the subsidy must be automatic

where the criteria are satisfied.

Finally,

the objective

must be neutral and must not favor certain enterprises or

industries over others.

'''^^

De jure specificity addresses legal,

restrictions on the availability of
clear-cut example of

a de

a

textual

subsidy benefit.

A

jure specific subsidy can be

found in Live Swine from Canada

.'^^^

This case involved

benefits to hog producers under the British Columbia Farm

^^^

See The Act sec. 771(5A)
(West Supp. 1998)

(D) (i),

(ii),

19 U.S.C.A.

§

1677(5A)

(D) (i).

:ii)
^2'

The Act sec.
s
Supp. 199?

^^°

See Live Swine from Canada; Final Results of Countervailing Duty,
Administrative Review, 56 Fed. Reg. 50560 (1991)

771(5A)

(D) (ii),

19 U.S.C.A.

§

1677(5A)

(D) (ii)

(West
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Income Insurance Act

.

'^^^

The Farm Income Insurance Act of

1973 listed in its Schedule B guidelines all products,

whose producers are eligible to receive benefits under
this program.

^^^

The Department of Commerce found the

program specific since "the program is limited to

a

specific group of enterprises or industries, and,
therefore,

is countervailable,

because it is only

available to farmers producing commodities under Schedule
B

guidelines of the Farm Income Insurance Act of 1973.

'^^'^

Questionable is whether de jure specificity exists only
where the statute expressly specifies the benefiting

industry or enterprise as

a

recipient of the subsidy or

whether it is sufficient that one can establish the

beneficiaries by analyzing the statute.

The Department of

Commerce applied in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada the second interpretation

"^'^'^
.

Although the statute

did not explicitly set forth the beneficiaries of the
program, the Department of Commerce found that the LER'
"on their face, benefit only

logs

...

[British Columbia]

users of

Accordingly, the domestic benefits conferred by

^^^

See id. at 50563.

^^^

See id.

1" Id
134

See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
22610.

supra 86 note at

5i

these export restraints are de jure limited to

group of industries
though,

.

"^^^

a

specific

This question is only academic

since one can establish de facto specificity by

furnishing evidence that

a

statute in fact benefits only

one specific enterprise or industry.
De jure specificity does not exist,

however, where

a

program merely restricts the access to certain benefits.
The CIT found in PPG Industries

v.

United States the

Mexican Trust Fund for Coverage of Risks

since

(FICORCA)

sector neutral and objective factors formed the basis of

criteria for eligibility, and if eligibility is automatic
once these factors are met,

then the program is not de

jure specific even though eligibility may be limited on
its

face."'"'^^

FICORCA was

a

trust fund set up by the

Mexican government, which provided Mexican firms with
registered debt in foreign currency an payable abroad with
foreign currency at

a

controlled

that "the mere fact that

a

rate."'"'^'^

The CIT hold

program contains certain

eligibility requirements for participation does not
transform the program into one which has provided

a

countervailable benefit. The test necessarily involves

135

Id.

^^^

See PPG Industries v. United States,

"^ See

id.

at 350.

supra note 119,

at 353
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subjective case by case decisions to determine whether
there is

a

discrete class of beneficiaries

"^^^
.

The concept of de jure specificity as applied by the

Department of Commerce and adjudicated by the CIT provided
the basis for the SCM regulation in Article 2.1(a)

and

(b)

and its interpretation has therefore not to be changed to

comply with the SCM Agreement.

3

.

De facto Specificity

Section 771(5A)D) (iii)

of The Act lists the factors to

be examined with respect to de facto specificity.

factors,

tracking the language in Article 2.1(c) of the

SCM Agreement,
"(I)

These

are:

The actual recipients of the subsidy, whether

considered on an enterprise or industry basis, are
limited in number.
(II)

An enterprise or industry is a predominant user of
the subsidy.

(III)

An enterprise of industry receives

a

disproportionately large amount of the subsidy.

"^ See id.

at 353,

60
(IV)

The manner in which the authority providing the

subsidy has exercised discretion in the decision
to grant the subsidy indicates that an enterprise
or industry is favored over others

"^'^^
.

De facto specificity addresses the usage of a program'

benefits by

a

specific enterprise or industry even if

statutory and regulatory eligibility requirements are
neutral and objective on their face, or if the benefits of
a

program are nominally available to the entire economy.
The concept of de facto specificity has been developed

by

a

Co.

number of CIT decisions from Carlisle Tire

and.

Rubber

to PPG Industries and focuses on the de facto access

to the benefits of a program by a specific enterprise or

industry.

But there has been no definition at what point

an enterprise or industry becomes the specific beneficiary
of a subsidy.

A de facto specificity test does make only

little sense when it finds generally available

a

program

that provides ninety-nine per cent of its benefit to a

specific industry, even if the remaining one percent

benefits dozens of industries.

If the total number of

beneficiaries is too broad, the relevant question then
becomes how dominant or disproportionate is the specific

^^^

The Act sec.
Supp. 1998)

771(5A)

(D)

(ill),

19 U.S.C.A.

§

1677(5A)

(D) (ill)

(West
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industry's use of the program's benefits.

The SCM

Agreement tries to clarify this issue by adding the terms
'dominant use'

and 'disproportionate beneficiary'

into the

concept of de facto specificity.

Dominant Use

a.

The dominant use analysis is based on the share of the

benefit of

program to an enterprise or an industry.

a

set guidelines,

use

No

however, exist for establishing dominant

.

In Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from

Thailand,

the Department of Commerce found in its

preliminary determinations that an industry that availed
itself for 45 percent of

dominant

use.'^'^°

a

program was specific based on

According to the Department of Commerce

approximately 45 percent of the rediscounts under this

program were provided on the short-term promissory notes
of producers of all products classified as textiles in

This percentage indicates that textile

Thailand.

producers receive

a

disproportionate share of these

rediscountable loans.

Therefore, although there does

not appear a de jure limitation within the program
'^°

Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain
Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Thailand, 49 Fed. Reg. 49661,
49662 (1984)
.
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eligibility criteria, there does appear to be de facto
limitation on the way in which the program operates

This case involved the Bank of Thailand'

s

^''^
.

Regulations

Governing the Rediscount of Promissory Notes Arising from
Industrial Undertakings permitting commercial banks to

rediscount short-term promissory notes for industrial

purchases

^^^
.

The use of the term disproportionate'
be mistaken with the

does not have to

disproportionate beneficiary'

analysis which will be discussed in Chapter IV.

3. b

of this

thesis
In its determination the Department of Commerce speaks

of an indication and does not use a mathematical formula.

Given the complex nature of this determinations and the

differences in the industry structure of every country,

a

case-by-case determination seems to be the most reasonable
approach.

Nonetheless, the Department of Commerce should

at least establish a framework for its analysis to provide

guidance and reliability in its determinations.

'''

Id.

^'^

See id.
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b.

Disproportionate Beneficiary

If not as a dominant user,

receive

an enterprise or industry can

disproportionate benefit under

a

a

program.

Two

arguments support this theory to deem an enterprise or

industry as specific, although it is not the dominant user
of benefit.

First,

benefit,

an industry may be receiving a disproportionate

thus distorting the economy, when the share of

its total use of the program'

s

benefits is far greater

than its contribution to the economy

argue that an industry receives

...

Second,

one might

disproportionately large

a

benefit compared with other users of

a

program.

"^^'^

In Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from

Korea,

the Department of Commerce used

a

ration between

the share of loans and industry received and that

industry's share of the economy to determine that the
steel industry was not receiving

a

of the medium- and long-term loans.

disproportionate share
'^''^

This case involved

medium- and long-term loans through government direction

designed to finance major or key industries to Korean
^"^
^^^

Ragosta

&

Shanker,

supra note 92 at 668,

669.

See Final Affirmative Duty Determination;
Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel
Flat-Rolled Products from Korea;
and Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination; Carbon Steel Structural Shapes from Korea, 4 9
Fed. Reg. 47284, 47289 (1984).
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producers of shapes and sheet, as part of the Korean steel
industry,

which were made on terms that were inconsistent
The Department of

with commercial considerations.'^''^

Commerce found that
[n]

otwithstanding that certain of the sources have been

created to provide credit to designated groups of
recipients,

these groups do not receive

a

disproportionate share of the total medium- and longterm credit available from all sources combined.
Moreover, we determine that the steel industry does not

receive
sources.

a

disproportionate share of funds from all these
Indeed,

over the last 15 years,

industry has accounted for approximately
of GNP.

the steel
6

to 13 percent

During the same period the basic metals sector,

which includes steel, has received

medium- and long-term loans.

5

to

8

percent of

''"''^

In Certain Heavy Iron Construction Castings From Brazil,

the Department of Commerce again compared the ratio of

percentage of GDP to the industry'

share of the benefit

s

to find that no specificity existed

^^"'
.

This case involved

the Brazilian Fund for Developing of Mining and Metallurgy
(FDM),

which provided through the government-owned

Development Bank of Minas Gerais

^''^

(BDMG)

loans to foundries

See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination;
Certain
Heavy Iron Construction Castings From Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 9491,
9494

(1986)
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on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.'^''^

Here the Department of Commerce found that mining and

metallurgy together contributed over 51 percent to the
Gross Domestic Product of the state, while receiving 33

percent of the credit extended by the BDMG in 1984.

There

is no evidence of targeting of these of other BDMG funds

Accordingly, we

to the industry under investigation.

determine that loans under the FDM program are not limited
to a specific enterprise or industry or group of

enterprises or industries

.

''^^

In the disproportionate beneficiary analysis the

Department of Commerce does not use
formula as well.

a

set mathematical

A pragmatically case-by-case approach

seems to be reasonable here,

too,

in order to take

different economic situations in different countries into
consideration.

But the Department of Commerce should

develop certain standards and framework in its

determinations to make them reliable and reconstructable

'''

See id.

'''

Id.

V.

Conclusion

a

big step forward towards the

elimination of subsidies.

The SCM Agreement provides,

The SCM Agreement is

compared to the GATT and the Subsidies Code, the means to
tackle domestic subsidies, which potentially distort the

allocation of resources in an economy.
the SCM Agreement recognizes that

a)

At the same token,

domestic subsidies

can serve a purpose that justifies the misallocation of

resources and

b)

specific subsidies rather than general,

cross-industry subsidies should be singled out as
countervailable since they favor certain market
participants and distort the allocation of resources.
By deeming certain domestic subsidies as non-actionable,

the SCM Agreement acknowledges certain policy objectives

that are more important than ideal economic conditions.

Research subsidies further scientific accomplishments in
areas that are economically non-lucrative but benefit the
society.

Subsidies for disadvantaged regions equalize

economic disparities in countries with disparate economic
structures.

In doing so,

this kind of subsidies enhances

66

67

the quality of life in disadvantaged regions,

which is

viewed as more important than allocating resources in
better suited regions even if this would be economically
more reasonable.

Environmental adaptation subsidies, the

third category of non-actionable subsidies,

serve the

important goal of furthering environmental protection.
The specificity test serves the purpose of eliminating

subsidies benefiting only particular enterprises or

industries while allowing countries to subsidize the whole

economy to achieve certain policy objectives not covered
by Article
5

percent.

8

of the SCM Agreement to a de-minimis level of

Problematic, though, is the lack of

standard underlying the test.

a

defined

This lack has afforded the

Department of Commerce discretion in applying the

countervailing duty statute.

This allows the Department

of Commerce to take in consideration the effect and intent

of a particular government benefit.

While this might be

helpful in cases where subsidies serve overwhelmingly

important policy objectives it makes countervailing duty

investigations opaque and inconstructable
An alternative to the specificity test would be to

abandon the test and lower the de-minimis level.

This

would transform countervailing duty determinations to
mere mathematical analysis and eliminate Department of

a

68

Commerce's discretion.

Although this approach would make

those determinations more predictable,

it disregards that

the scrutiny of subsidies only under mathematical aspects

Subsidies serve

neglects economic and political reality.

as an important vehicle for the achievement of policy

objectives that have different ranks in different
countries. These objectives can reach a far higher rank
than the goal to maintain ideal economic conditions.

What has to be changed is the application of the

specificity test.

A case-by-case approach is reasonable

because it takes the intent and effect of
benefit into account.

a

government

But the Department of Commerce

should establish objective criteria to afford

a

framework

in the determining the thresholds of the dominant use and

disproportionate beneficiary analysis.

This would make

its determinations more understandable and objective and

thus more difficult to target.
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